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THE BIG BAD INTERNET:
REASSESSING SERVICE PROVIDER IMMUNITY
UNDER § 230 TO PROTECT THE PRIVATE
INDIVIDUAL FROM UNRESTRAINED INTERNET
COMMUNICATION
MOLLY SACHSON
INTRODUCTION
For most Americans, surfing the Internet has become as much a part of
their daily routine as getting dressed in the morning.1 They can read the
latest reports on the escalating oil prices or the approaching tropical storm,2
send quick messages to friends and relatives about their son's first
birthday,3 check to see whether the Yankees beat the Red Sox, 4 or buy a
pair of this season's most coveted Jimmy Choo stilettos.5 They can also
peruse or contribute to their favorite forums. Forums, which are special-
interest group discussions, embody the "Internet at its liveliest." 6 There are
thousands of forums on the Internet, dedicated to everything from cooking7
I According to a 2008 survey, over 74% of the American population used the Internet. Internet
World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, http://www.intemetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2009). This figure represents a 134% increase since 2000. See id.
2 See, e.g., CNN, http://www.crn.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2009); National and Local Weather
Forecast, Hurricane, Radar and Report, http://www.weather.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
3 See, e.g., Gmail: Email from Google, http://www.mail.google.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2009);
Meebo: Instant Messaging Everywhere, http://www.meebo.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
4 See, e.g., ESPN: The World Leader in Sports, http://www.espn.go.com (last visited Nov. 18,
2009); CBS Sports, http://www.sportsline.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
5 See, e.g., Bluefly: The Ultimate Hook-up for the Fashion Obsessed, http://www.bluefly.com (last
visited Nov. 18, 2009).
6 Journey to Forever: Internet Interaction, http://joumeytoforever.org/intemet how.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2009). Forums are places where millions of people meet every day to "find like-minded
friends, swap ideas and share resources." Id.
7 See Discuss Cooking Forum and Community, http://www.discusscooking.com (last visited Nov.
18, 2009).
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to salamanders. 8 Because Internet users from all over the world can access
and contribute to these "self-help communities and clubhouses," 9 forums
have the potential to offer a wealth of invaluable information.' 0 At the
same time, however, forums may also foster harmful or illegal
commentary."I As Internet forums and discussion boards continue to
multiply, the private individual may become increasingly vulnerable to
defamation, invasion of privacy, and infringement of constitutional rights.12
Thus, the question arises: how do we protect the population from unbridled
third-party forum postings?
An individual hoping to recover from a statement made in Cyberspace
will run into two very serious obstacles. First, he will most likely be
unable to identify the third-party responsible for the commentary since
most forum postings are made anonymously.13 Internet service providers
who feature chat rooms and forums on their websites afford users this
anonymity through the mechanism of "user names,"14 which allow people
8 See Caudata.org: The Newt and Salamander Portal, http://www.caudata.org/index.php (last
visited Nov. 18, 2009).
9 Journey to Forever: Internet Interaction, http://joumeytoforever.org/intemet-how.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2009).
10 See id. (noting that discussions in forums "accumulate into databases that are a mine of useful
information"); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining that the
Internet is a "unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication").
II See, e.g., Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that a
discussion board linked a photograph of a young woman and displayed messages describing the alleged
criminal history of the woman's father, accusing the woman of abusing heroin, fantasizing about being
raped by her father, and having a sexually transmitted disease); Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil
Rights Under Law, Inc. v, Craigslist, Inc., 519 F. 3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing a forum for
individuals looking to buy, sell, or rent housing that included postings claiming "no minorities" and "no
children" in violation of the Fair Housing Act); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (examining a dating website which displayed a fabricated profile indicating that a
well-known actress was "'looking for a one-night stand' and a man with a "'strong sexual appetite').
12 See DANIEL J. SOLOvE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 4 (Yale University Press 2007) (suggesting that there is a "dark side" to the Internet that
poses threats to "people's control over their reputations and their ability to be who they want to be");
see also Lilian Edwards, Defamation and the Internet: Name Calling in Cyberspace, in LAW AND THE
INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE (1997), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/it&law/cl0_main
.htm (describing how discussion fora are a part of the "defamation prone zone" of the Internet).
13 See Christopher Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to Cyberspace: Towards a New
Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation for Internet Service Providers, 6 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 247, 260 (2000) (indicating that one of the "great[est] stumbling block[s]" that a
person who has been defamed or injured in Cyberspace might face is the "ease with which the medium
facilitates anonymity") (alterations in original); ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT
899 (7th ed. 2006) (explaining that while it may be possible to discover the Internet provider address of
an online third-party, it will be very difficult to ascertain the actual name of the person corresponding to
that provider address).
14 See, e.g., Doe 1, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 250-51 (discussing that an individual posted the explicit
remarks about the plaintiff under the pseudonym "AK47"); see also SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 139
(noting that 55 percent of bloggers use pseudonyms instead of their real names (citing Amanda Lenhart
& Susannah Fox, Bloggers: A Portrait of the Internet 's New Storytellers, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN
LIFE PROJECT, July, 19, 2006, http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP/%20Bloggers%20Report%/20July/
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to post anything without facing criticism for their views or repercussions
for their insults.15 Second, if he sues the website provider in lieu of the
unidentified poster, he will have to contend with § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act ("§ 230").16 This provision creates
immunity for an interactive computer "service provider" in any cause of
action that would make him liable for information originating with
"another information content provider." 17 Therefore, unless the website
provider was also acting as another "content provider," the plaintiffs claim
will likely be dismissed.
Determining whether a website provider, or "webhost," has acted as a
"content provider," however, may not always be an easy task. When a
website provider creates an Internet discussion board dedicated to a topic
such as celebrity gossip,1 8 but does not contribute to the ongoing discourse
or supervise the activities of its users, 19 it is fairly clear that he is simply a
service provider. In contrast, if in addition to providing a forum for third
parties to discuss the celebrity gossip, the webhost also broadcasts his own
personal opinions and general commentary on the subject matter,20 he is a
content provider.
With that in mind, how would the courts characterize a website provider
who does not necessarily express his own viewpoint, but who guides the
subject matter of the subscribers' postings by posing provocative
questions? 21 For example, consider a celebrity gossip forum in which the
webhost asks his subscribers: "What do you think of Tom Cruise? Did
anyone see his latest movie that tanked in the box office?" The website
provider does not express his personal opinions about or criticisms of Tom
2019%202006.pdf)).
15 See Butler, supra note 13, at 260-61 (suggesting that "[a]nonymity has been both one of the
most praised and vilified features of the Internet" because on one hand, it allows people to post their
opinions without the fear of harassment and on the other hand, it allows people to seriously damage
another individual's reputation without the fear of getting caught); Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The
Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 137, 137,
156-57, 2008 (discussing how the Internet has made speech completely free, but presents obstacles in
defamation claims where the speech is anonymous).
16 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
17 Id. at § 230(c).
18 See, e.g., About.com, Celebrity Gossip, http://forums.about.com/n/pfx/forum.aspx?nav=
messages&webtag-ab-gossip (last visited Oct. 6, 2008); see also IVillage Celebrity Chatter,
http://messageboards.ivillage.com/iv-enmovies (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
19 See About.com, supra note 18; IVillage Celebrity Chatter, supra note 18.
20 See, e.g., Celebrity Gossip Blog from Perez Hilton, http://www.perezhilton.com (last visited
Sept. 28, 2008) (broadcasting webhost's personal opinions and creating a forum for third parties'
commentary); Gossip Center, http://www.celebrity-gossip.net/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (creating
celebrity gossip headlines and opportunities for third parties to comment).
21 See, e.g., Celebrity Gossip Blog from Perez Hilton, http://www.perezhilton.com (last visited
Nov. 15, 2008) (posing provocative questions to website subscribers).
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Cruise, but he does induce his subscribers to do so. By encouraging
responses from third parties, the webhost is arguably doing more than
providing the service - he is indirectly creating content because without his
question, the harmful response might never have been made. Be that as it
may, he is not necessarily a content provider because he is not directly
creating the information himself. Thus, his actions fall somewhere within
the gray area between "content provider" and "service provider."
Because the methods available to a website provider do not always fit
neatly into categories of content providing or service providing, it seems
unwise to base the decision of immunity solely on this dichotomy. If the
courts continue to rely on this, website providers who have in fact been
responsible for the dissemination of tortious or illegal language, perhaps
because they have solicited the comments from third parties through
provocative questions, may escape liability if the court happens to
determine that they were simply "service providers." Thus, the individual
may be deprived of a recovery. In order to prevent such unfair results, the
courts must reassess the extent of protection provided under § 230 and
consider extending liability to webhosts in certain situations, perhaps even
where they are solely acting as service providers.
This Note examines the precise terms of § 230 and suggests that the
statute should not be interpreted broadly as granting absolute blanket
immunity to all Internet service providers. Rather, this Note argues that a
more narrow interpretation of § 230 that imposes liability under limited
circumstances is consistent with Congressional intent and the authority of
First Amendment law. Such an interpretation will also have the beneficial
effect of encouraging website providers to act more responsibly in
screening for illegal or tortious content, thereby protecting the private
individual's right to be free from discrimination, defamation, and invasion
of privacy.
Part I provides a brief summary of the original approach to Internet
service provider liability and examines the policy rationales behind the
enactment of § 230. Part IIA illustrates the widespread judicial preference
for interpreting § 230 as providing broad, robust immunity for Internet
service providers. Part IIB, however, highlights a recent opinion from the
Ninth Circuit that diverged from the trend of granting absolute immunity
and held a website provider liable for developing discriminatory content in
violation of the Fair Housing Act. Part III evaluates the arguments on both
sides of the debate over the extent of webhost immunity in order to
underscore the importance of the issues at stake in the circuit split.
Part IV suggests that the Ninth Circuit's decision to limit the broad scope
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of immunity under § 230 was a necessary step in the right direction.
Extending liability will protect the private person's ability to be free from
illegal or tortious third-party attacks without undermining Congress's intent
to promote the growth of the Internet. This Note proposes that the standard
for imposing liability should not depend solely on whether the webhost was
a service provider or a content provider. Rather, the standard should focus
on the extent to which the nature of the website was such that it should
have put the Internet service provider on notice of the risk of illegal or
tortious postings.
I. THE ROAD TO § 230
The extent of liability for Internet providers has been in flux since the
earliest days of the Internet. In the early 1990's, the courts granted
immunity in situations where it was apparent that the website provider was
acting as a distributor, as opposed to a publisher, of information.22 To make
this distinction, the courts focused on the degree of editorial control that the
provider exercised over the content on his website. 23 If the webhost did not
review anything before displaying it on the forum, the courts often treated
him as the "functional equivalent of a more traditional news vendor."24
Thus, the courts would not likely impute knowledge of the disputed
material to him.25 In contrast, if the webhost monitored, edited, or removed
content from his website, 26 the courts treated him as a publisher of
information.27 As such, he would be liable for unlawful commentary if he
failed to delete or alter it.28
One problem with this approach was that the analogy between an
Internet service provider and a traditional news distributor, such as a
22 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting
immunity in situations where it was clear that the website provider was acting as a distributor rather
than a publisher of information).
23 See id. at 140 (noting that the webhost had no more editorial control over publication "than does
a public library, book store, or newsstand").
24 Id
25 See id. at 141 (agreeing that the webhost acted as a distributor and thus had neither knowledge
nor reason to know of the allegedly defamatory statements on his website, especially given the large
number of publications it carried and the speed with which the webhost uploaded third-party content
and made it available to subscribers); see also Robert T. Langdon, Note, The Communications Decency
Act § 230: Make Sense? Or Nonsense? - A Private Person's Inability to Recover if Defamed in
Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 829, 841 (1999) (noting that distributors, such as bookstores or
newsstands, are not expected to monitor the contents of every book or magazine they sell).
26 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 at *10 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
27 Id at*10-11.
28 Id at *11.
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bookstore or newsstand, was flawed. First, a website provider plays a very
different role in supplying information and ideas than does the traditional
distributor. Specifically, the website provider typically has no knowledge
of an author's identity or the subject matter of the postings, whereas a
bookstore or newsstand is usually involved to some extent in the selection
of merchandise. 29 Second, a website provider is distinguishable because he
is not necessarily motivated by the need to maintain a reputation for
accurate reporting. A traditional distributor must uphold such a reputation
because if he starts to provide poor quality information, customers may be
deterred from making purchases in the future. An Internet service provider,
in contrast, will probably not suffer if he supplies inferior information
because the public does not always expect perfect accuracy;30 it expects a
forum for diverse and compelling ideas.31 Because website providers are
not in effect comparable to news distributors, an approach that attempts to
treat them the same is fundamentally unsound. A more serious problem
with the original approach, however, was that it had the effect of
discouraging good faith self-policing on the part of website providers who
feared being treated as publishers.32
In 1996, Congress enacted § 230 in an effort to address the problems of
the distributor-publisher approach and to mitigate its harsh consequences.
Section 230(c), which is entitled "Protection for 'good Samaritan' blocking
and screening of offensive material," grants immunity for any actions
"voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of'
29 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 13, at 258 (confirming that the website operator in Stratton Oakmont
did not "solicit articles or pay the participants"); see also Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v.
Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third-party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 496,
471 (2004) (discussing how booksellers merely distribute their content).
30 See Butler, supra note 13, at 259. "Unlike the assertions made in a newspaper or magazine,
which have an extra veneer of truth because the public knows the articles are approved and
commissioned by editors, the public likely holds no similar illusions about the postings in a public
forum." Id; see also Stratton Oakmont, 1995 Misc. LEXIS at *6 (noting the willingness to discuss the
variety of information that can be posted).
31 See Butler, supra note 13, at 259 (noting that the website operator in Stratton Oakmont, who was
fully "committed to open debate and discussion," never made any assertion about the reliability of the
postings on the website (quoting Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 at *6)); see also Jay
Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, for Regulation? 41 AKRON L. REV. 101, 102 (1997)
(discussing the diversity of ideas on the internet).
32 See Fair Hous. Council v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (indicating
that "under Stratton Oakmont, online service providers that voluntarily filter some messages become
liable for all messages transmitted, whereas providers that ignore problematic posts altogether escape
liability"); see also David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 158 (1997)
(emphasizing the fact that a website provider who assumes the responsibility for at least attempting to
keep offensive content off his website will be liable for any illegal or tortious postings - but an operator
who makes no such responsible attempt will escape all liability).
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offensive material.33 The act also provides that "no provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider." 34 The
language of § 230 plainly suggests that courts may not hold a website
provider liable for performing traditional editorial functions. 35 Thus, § 230
effectively overrules past decisions where website providers were treated as
publishers of content simply because they restricted access to other
information on the website. 36
Congress passed § 230 with two basic policy rationales in mind.37 First,
it hoped to promote the self-regulation of Internet service providers by
removing the threat of potential liability for editing third-party content.38
Second, it sought to "promote the continued development of the Internet"
and encourage the free exchange of ideas. 39 In the statutory findings,
Congress noted that the Internet, which has provided a "forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity," 40 has flourished
33 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (1996).
34 Id. at § 230(c)(1). An "information content provider" is "any person or entity that is responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service." Id. § 230(f)(3). An "interactive computer service" is "any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server[.]" Id. § 230(f)(2).
35 See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that courts are
precluded from entertaining claims that seek to hold a website provider liable for "its exercise of a
publisher's traditional editorial functions - such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content"); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298 (D.N.H. 2008) (noting that
"a service provider's exercise of its editorial prerogatives as to information from another content
provider does not transform the service provider into the content provider under § 230").
36 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163 (noting that the House Conference Report explicitly
indicated that one purpose of § 230 was to "overrule Stratton-Oakmont [sic] v. Prodigy and any other
similar decisions" (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10)); see also Landgon, supra note 25, at 844 (explaining that § 230 overruled Stratton
Oakmont so that providers who filter out certain content will not be deemed to have exercised editorial
control).
37 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (outlining the policies behind the Communications Decency
Act); see also Eric M. D. Zion, Protecting the E-Marketplace of Ideas by Protecting Employers:
Immunity for Employers Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 54 FED. COMM. L.J.
493, 505 (2002) (discussing the rationales behind section 230 of the Communications Decency Act).
38 See § 230(b)(3) ("It is the policy of the United States ... (3) to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families,
and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services[.]"); see also Chicago
Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669-70 (7th Cir.
2008) ("'Removing the risk of civil liability may induce web hosts and other informational
intermediaries to take more care to protect the privacy and sensibilities of third parties."' (quoting Doe
v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003))).
39 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (identifying the promotion of the continued development of the
Internet as one of the policy reasons behind the Act); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the promotion of the free exchange of ideas was one of the
policy reasons for the act (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2003))).
40 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
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to the benefit of the people largely without government intervention.41
Thus, it was Congress's policy to "preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that exists for the Internet ... unfettered by Federal or State
regulation." 42
II. INTERPRETING THE EXTENT OF IMMUNITY UNDER § 230
A. The Traditional Understanding of§ 230: Robust or Bust
Historically, the courts have interpreted § 230 broadly.43 Since its
enactment, the courts have consistently adopted an "expansive definition of
'interactive computer service' and a relatively restrictive definition of
'information content provider.'"44 They have justified their liberal
understanding of the statute by arguing that extensive webhost immunity is
consistent with the congressional policy concerns. 45
The effect of the courts' expansive understanding of the statute has been
that as long as the information has been provided by a third party, website
operators will be absolutely immune from liability. 46 One of the earliest
cases to apply § 230 was Zeran v. America Online, Inc.47 There, an
anonymous person posted a message on an America Online bulletin board
advertising the sale of T-shirts with distasteful slogans about the Oklahoma
City bombing. 48 The advertisement encouraged people who were interested
41 See id § 230(a)(4) ("The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.").
42 See id § 230(b)(2); see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)
("Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and,
accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.").
43 See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (characterizing immunity under § 230 as "quite robust"); see
also Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. America
Online Got it Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 585 (2008) (indicating that
website providers have enjoyed immunity for a wide range of legal claims, including defamation,
employment torts, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation).
44 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123. See generally § 230(f)(2-3) (defining the terms "interactive
computer service" and "information content provider").
45 See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122-23 (noting that reviewing courts have been generous in granting
immunity in light of Congress' goal to encourage the free exchange of ideas and the voluntary
monitoring of offensive content); see also Ziniti, supra note 43, at 585 (suggesting that the courts'
broad construction of § 230 most likely "stems from the statute's stated aims" in section 230(b)).
46 See Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180 (McKeown, C.J., dissenting) (indicating that website
providers will be immune for basically anything that third parties post on a website, including "auctions
of paintings that may have been stolen by Nazis [or] biting comments about steroids in baseball" (citing
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F. 3d 666, 671 (7th
Cir. 2008))); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (remarking that § 230(c) provides broad immunity for
publishing content provided primarily by third parties).
47 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
48 Id. at 329.
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in purchasing the T-shirts to call the plaintiffs home telephone number. 49
After receiving a deluge of calls from angry Internet users, the plaintiff
requested that America Online remove the posting.SO Although America
Online complied, the anonymous party posted a similar posting the next
day.51 The Fourth Circuit held that America Online was immune from
liability because it fell within the traditional definition of a publisher, 52 and
by the explicit terms of § 230, the courts are prohibited from "entertaining
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's
role." 53 The court further noted that even if America Online had acted as a
distributor, it would not have been precluded from the protection of §
230.54 The court indicated that in passing § 230, "Congress made a policy
choice ... not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for their
parties' potentially injurious messages."55
A few years after the decision in Zeran, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the
wide scope of § 230 immunity in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com.56 In that
case, a dating website had allowed an unidentified party to post a personal
profile for a popular actress without the actress's knowledge or consent.57
As a result of the provocative posting, the actress began to receive a
number of phone calls, messages, and e-mails from individuals who were
interested in meeting her.58 The actress's assistant eventually learned of the
49 Id.
50 See id. (explaining that most of the calls contained angry or derogatory messages, but some of
the calls comprised of death threats).
51 See id. The second posting, which also advertised the sale of T-shirts related to the bombing,
further encouraged interested parties to call the plaintiff's number. Id. The post said: "please call back if
busy" because there was such a large demand for the shirts. Id. As a result, the angry telephone calls
escalated. Id. Over the next several days, the anonymous party continued to post advertisements for the
sale of miscellaneous Oklahoma City bombing merchandise, including bumper stickers and key chains.
Id.
52 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. Although the plaintiff sued America Online for negligence, the court
found that his claim was "indistinguishable from a garden variety defamation action." Id. Thus, the
court analyzed the case as if the plaintiff had sued for defamation. Id. Because those who "'[take] part
in publication [are] charged with publication" under defamation law, the court found that America
Online was a publisher. Id (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 113, at 799 (5th ed. 1984)).
53 Id. at 330.
54 See id at 332 ("[Distributor] liability is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability, and
is therefore also foreclosed by § 230.").
55 Id. at 330-3 1.
56 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding an internet dating service immune from liability pursuant
to § 230).
57 See id at 1121. The profile contained several pictures of the actress, as well as a description of
her interests and appearance. Id. The profile indicated that the actress was "looking for a one night
stand," and a "hard dominant" man with a "strong sexual appetite." Id. The profile also listed her
address and home telephone number. Id
58 See id. At least one of the correspondences was sexually explicit and threatening. See id
20 11] 36 1
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improper posting and contacted the dating website to demand that the
profile be removed. 59 In spite of the "utterly deplorable consequences" of
the wrongful posting, the court held that the dating website was protected
from liability under § 230.60 The court was persuaded that § 230 granted
"robust" immunity6' - especially for content provided primarily by third
parties.62 In fact, the court insisted that immunity applies even where the
information is provided in response to a website's detailed questionnaire. 63
The Ninth Circuit opined that unless the webhost "create[s] or develop[s]
the particular information at issue," the claim against him will be barred
under § 230.64
In a more recent case, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,65 the Seventh Circuit joined the
consensus that immunity under § 230 is "robust." Craigslist is a forum for
individuals who are interested in, among other things, buying, selling or
renting housing.66 Lawyers' Committee claimed that the postings on the
website proclaiming "no minorities" and "no children" 67 violated the Fair
Housing Act.68 The court, however, declined to extend liability to
Craigslist because as a mere messenger of the illegal content, it was
immune under § 230.69 The court conceded that Craigslist played a causal
role in the publication of the content to the extent that "no one could post a
discriminatory ad if [it] did not offer a forum." 70 Causation under the Fair
Housing Act, however, refers to "causing . .. the discriminatory content of
59 See id. at 1122. The website temporarily blocked the profile from public view, but then fully
deleted the posting the next moming. Id.
60 Id. at 1125.
61 Id. at 1123 (indicating that broad immunity under § 230 has developed in light of the policy
reasons underlying the statute). See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
62 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 ("Under § 230(c) .. . so long as a third party willingly provides the
essential published content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the
specific editing or selection process.").
63 See id. at 1124-25. The plaintiff argued that the dating website contributed content to the
website by asking detailed questions and providing a menu of "pre-prepared responses." Id. The court,
however, did not find that website was responsible for the underlying content. Id
6 Id. at 1125. The dating website did not create or develop the content at issue in this case because
the critical information, such as the actress's home address and phone number and the sexually
suggesting comments, was transmitted to the website unaltered by the webhost. See id
65 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
66 Id. at 668.
67 Id.
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988) (prohibiting certain forms of discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin).
69 See Craigslist, 519 F.3d. at 672 (explaining that the plaintiff "cannot sue the messenger just
because the message reveals a third party's plan to engage in unlawful discrimination").
70 Id. at 671.
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a statement."71 Because Craigslist did not encourage its subscribers in
anyway to express their discriminatory preferences, the court held that it
was simply a distributor and thus protected by § 230's immunity.72
B. The Ninth Circuit Limits the Scope of§ 230 Immunity
In the wake of the swelling support for broad immunity under § 230,73
the Ninth Circuit made a decisive split from the other circuit courts in Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, LLC.74
Roommates.com is a website that purports to match people looking for
housing with people who are renting out spare rooms. 75 In order to use the
website's services, the subscriber must create a profile describing himself
with respect to three criteria provided in drop-down menus: sex, sexual
orientation and whether he will bring children to the home. 76 After that, the
subscriber must specify the type of roommate that he is looking for based
on the same three criteria.77 Roommates.com then publishes the
subscriber's responses, thereby making his information available to fellow
subscribers looking for a roommate. 78
Fair Housing Council contended that Roommates.com's business
violated the Fair Housing Act 79 and the state housing discrimination
71 Id.
72 See id. at 671-72 (noting further that Craigslist might have been deemed to have "caused" the
discriminatory content if it had offered a lower price to people who included discriminatory statements
in their postings).
73 See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000)
(declining to extend liability to a website provider that displayed incorrect information about the
plaintiffs stock price and share volume on multiple occasions); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540
F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008) (holding an adult website immune under § 230 for false and
unauthorized personal advertisements posted on its website by a third-party); Noah v. AOL Time
Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (E.D. Va. 2003) (granting immunity under § 230 to an Internet
service provider being sued for inadequately policing chat rooms where Muslims were "harassed,
insulted, threatened, ridiculed and slandered" by other chat room participants).
74 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
75 Id at 116 1.
76 Id Creating a profile is a strict condition of using Roommates.com; the subscriber cannot
advertise housing opportunities or peruse any listings if he does not have a profile. Id.
77 See id The drop-down menus provide the subscriber the option to indicate whether he is willing
to live with "straight or gay" males, only with "straight" males, only with "gay" males, or with "no
males." See id. at 1165. The subscriber must also choose either "I will live with children" or "I will not
live with children" from the drop-down menus. See id. The subscribers have an opportunity to elaborate
on their preferences in the "Additional Comments" section. Id. at 1161.
78 See id. at 1165. The responses are included in the profile page to help other subscribers
efficiently sort through the large number of people looking for a roommate. Id. If a subscriber is only
looking for a gay male roommate, he will be able to easily find which subscribers do not fit that
description by looking at the profile. See id.
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin).
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laws.80 Fair Housing Council's claim was two-fold. First, it claimed that in
requiring individuals to answer the profile questions as a precondition to
using the website, Roommates.com unlawfully forced its subscribers to
make discriminatory statements 81 concerning the sale or rental of housing
in violation of § 3604.82 Second, Fair Housing Council suggested that the
website's "development and display" of the subscribers' discriminatory
preferences was in itself unlawful. 83
Notwithstanding a vigorous dissent, 84 the Ninth Circuit agreed with Fair
Housing Council and held that Roommates.com was not protected by § 230
immunity. The thrust of the court's argument was that Roommates.com
was acting as an "information content provider," and thus fell outside the
scope of § 230.85 An "information content provider," as defined in § 230, is
"any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet[.]" 86
The court explained that in requiring its subscribers to provide answers
based on a set of pre-selected, discriminatory choices as a condition to
using the website's service, 87 Roommates.com effectively "developed" the
80 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955 (2009) (prohibiting the owner of any housing accommodation
from discriminating on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national
origin, ancestry, familial status, source of income, or disability").
81 A subscriber's answers to the profile questions are discriminatory because they indicate a
preference to only live with certain kinds of people. If a subscriber claims, using the drop-down menu,
that he is only interested in living with straight males without children, this implies that he is not willing
to live with females, gay individuals or individuals with children. The menu lacks a "no preference"
option and therefore the subscriber's answers will necessarily be discriminatory against some groups of
people. Furthermore, the subscriber's responses to the profile questions may also cause other
subscribers to discriminate against him. If he is a straight male, and another subscriber is seeking a gay
male roommate, that other subscriber will not consider him as a possible roommate. Such
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a violation of the Fair Housing Act.
82 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165. Councils interpret the precondition that subscribers
answer questions before being able to use the website as "unlawfully 'caus[ing]' subscribers to make a
'statement .. .with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates [a] preference, limitation, or
discrimination,' in violation of 42 U.S.C § 3604(c)." Id
83 Id.
84 See id. at 1176-89 (McKeown, C.J., dissenting).
85 See id. at 1162. Section 230(c)'s grant of immunity applies only if the interactive computer
service provider is not also an "information content provider." Id. "A website operator can be both a
service provider and a content provider: If it passively displays content that is created entirely by third
parties, then it is only a service provider with respect to that content. But as to content that it creates
itself, or is 'responsible in whole or in part' for creating or developing, the website is also a content
provider." Id.
86 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1998) (emphasis added).
87 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166. If a subscriber wants to use the website, he has no choice
but to answer Roommates.com's questions with one of the responses provided; he may not leave a
question blank, nor may he submit an answer that is not in the drop-down menu. See id. at 1165. Every
profile page was a "collaborate effort between [Roommates.com] and the subscriber" because
Roommates.com created the questions and the choice of answers. Id. at 1167. In this way, the court
suggested, the website was designed to solicit and enforce unlawful housing preferences. See id. at
1166.
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content that was alleged to violate the Fair Housing Act. 88 The court
determined that "[w]hen a business enterprise extracts [unlawful]
information from potential customers as a condition of accepting them as
clients, it is no stretch to say that the enterprise is responsible, at least in
part, for developing that information."89
In reaching its decision, the court adopted a fairly broad definition of
"development." 90 It interpreted the term development as referring "not
merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing
to its alleged unlawfulness."91 The court seemed to indicate that a webhost
materially contributes to the alleged illegality of its site if it creates the
content itself or if it requires or encourages its users in some way to input
the illicit content. 92 In an effort to clarify the standard, the majority
provided a few examples of what does, and what does not, amount to
development under § 230.93 On one hand, providing a "neutral tool," such
as a generic search engine, is not development because even though it may
be used to carry out illegal searches, the search engine itself does not
88 See id. at 1166. The subscribers to Roommates.com may be considered information content
providers because they created their own profiles and picked their own answers from the drop-down
menus. See id. at 1165. However, the court noted that the website is not necessarily precluded from
being treated as an information content provider because the users are also information content
providers. See id. A website may be liable for making the content available "even if the information
originated with a user." Id. at 1166 (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003)).
89 Id. at 1166. The court further suggested:
The [Federal Housing Act] makes it unlawful to ask certain discriminatory questions for a very
good reason: Unlawful questions solicit (a.k.a. "develop") unlawful answers. Not only does
[Roommates.com] ask these questions, [it] makes answering the discriminatory questions a
condition of doing business. This is no different from a real estate broker in real life saying, "Tell
me whether you're Jewish or you can find yourself another broker."
Id.
90 See id. at 1167-69 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3) (noting that "to read the term so broadly would
defeat the purpose of section 230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section otherwise
provides ... [but] at the same time, reading the exception for co-developers as applying only to content
that originates entirely with the website . . . ignores the words 'development . .. in part' in the statutory
passage 'creation or development' in whole or in part').
91 Id. at 1167-68 (emphasis added). In the dissent, in contrast, Judge McKeown proposed a more
narrow definition of development. See id. at 1184 (McKeown, C.J., dissenting). She would define
"development" as it is defined in the dictionary: "gradual advance or growth through progressive
changes." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 618 (2002)). The
majority, however, rejected this definition because it "excludes the kinds of swift and disorderly
changes that are the hallmark of growth on the Internet." Id. at 1168. Using the same dictionary, the
majority found a definition that was consistent with its understanding of the term and more suitable in
the realm of the Internet: "making usable or available." See id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 618 (2002)).
92 See id at 1174. "[T]here is no reason to believe that future courts will have any difficulty
applying this principle. The message to website operators is clear: If you don't encourage illegal
content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune." Id. at
1175.
93 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169 (elucidating its definition "in an abundance of caution,
and to avoid the kind of misunderstanding the dissent seems to encourage").
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contribute to the unlawfulness- the user creates the search on his own
terms.94 On the other hand, however, editing a message in a way that turns
an innocent message into an illegal one is development because it clearly
contributes to the unlawfulness of the content.95 The court resolved that
Roommates.com's activities fell into the latter category of cases because its
questions and answers forced users to enter responses that would be used
for discriminatory purposes in the sale or rental of housing, thereby directly
and materially contributing to the unlawfulness of the postings.96 In so
holding, the court imposed an unprecedented expansion of liability and
essentially uprooted the traditional notion of robust immunity for website
providers under § 230.
III. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF IMMUNITY UNDER § 230
The extent of Internet service provider immunity under § 230 implicates
competing public policy concerns. At one end of the spectrum is the fear
that anything less than absolute immunity will threaten the growth and
development of the Internet. At the other end, however, is the concern that
complete and expansive immunity jeopardizes the private person's right to
be free from discrimination, defamation, invasion of privacy, and other
wrongful conduct because it creates a disincentive for website providers to
act as responsibly as possible. The following sections consider the
arguments with respect to the degree of § 230 immunity in turn.
A. A Case for Expansive Immunity
Some legal scholars take the position that granting robust immunity for
website providers is the best, and perhaps only, way to protect the
expanding landscape of cyberspace and to encourage the free exchange of
ideas.97 One very specific argument is that imposing liability on Internet
94 See id Google, for example, does not "develop" illegal content simply because a user might use
it to search: looking for a "white roommate." Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3). "The term
'information content provider' means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service." Id.
95 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169 (citing as an example of this situation where a website
provider removes the word "not" from a user's message reading "[Name] did not steal the artwork");
see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that an editors' grammatical
corrections and posting of a third parties letter did not contribute to the unlawfulness of the content).
96 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172 (explaining that Roommates.com went beyond providing
mere neutral tools that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes); see also Goddard v. Google,
Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (suggesting that Roomates.com elicited "the
allegedly illegal content" and made "aggressive use of it in conducting its business").
97 The individuals espousing this view generally support broad immunity under § 230 because
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service providers will ultimately "[diminish] the value and promise" of the
new interactive online world.98 This argument flows from the belief that
the Internet is valuable because low barriers of entry99 provide the masses
with "unprecedented power to access, create, and publish." 00 Internet users
can share intelligence and actively create content for widespread public
view,101 and it is precisely from this diverse range of human input that the
Internet gains its value and "vast social utility."l 02 As a corollary, the
Internet would lose that value if input were to be constrained.103 Thus,
because extending liability would limit input by effectively forcing Internet
service providers to edit and filter content, 104 those individuals concerned
with preserving the Internet's value argue that there can be no alternative to
absolute immunity. 05
Another argument in favor of maintaining a judicial policy of robust
immunity is that any effort to expand liability will forcibly chill free speech
and the "robust development of the Internet" by creating substantial
Congress passed the act with a view towards accomplishing these very goals. For example, Cecilia
Ziniti endorses a broad interpretation of § 230 immunity because it "[effectuates] Congressional intent
to 'promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services."' See
Ziniti, supra note 43, at 610.
98 Id. at 595.
99 See id. at 591 (stating that "[a]nyone with access to a public library can access the Internet"); see
also Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, And
Accountability In The Law OfSearch, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1149, 1155 (2008) (suggesting that because
the internet has high accessibility and value because of its low barrier of entry).
100 Ziniti, supra note 43, at 591.
101 See id. at 590 (contrasting the current landscape of the Internet with the earlier model, where
users used "static directories" and "observed, found, and exchanged content passively" and privately);
see also ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (stating that the Internet allows millions of people
"to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information from around the world").
102 See Ziniti, supra note 43, at 591. In her article, Ziniti argues that the "network effect" is even
more powerful in the new, more interactive Internet than it was before. Id. at 593. She explains the
"network effect" as the notion that "the value of a network to a given customer depends on the numbers
of users of it." Id (citing Posting of Bob Metcalfe to VCMike's Blog, Metcalfe's Law Recurses Down
the Long Tail of Social Networking, http://-vcmike.wordpress.com/2006/08/18/metcalfe-social-
networks/ (Aug. 18, 2006)). Thus, as a result of the network effect, restricting human input would
necessarily destroy the value of the Internet "exponentially." Id
103 See id; see also James M. McGee, Recent Development: Burning the Village to Roast the Pig:
Congressional Attempt to Regulate "Indecency" on the Internet Rejected in ACLU v. Reno, 4 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 437, 462 (1997) ("[T]he negative consequences of restricting speech on the Internet through
the CDA are enormous . . . The strength of the Internet lies in its diversity of content due to a large
number of participants from a variety of backgrounds with easy access to the Internet.").
104 See Ziniti, supra note 43, at 594; see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining that "[m]aking interactive computer services and their users liable for the speech of
third parties would severely restrict the information available on the Internet").
105 See Ziniti, supra note 43, at 583 (opining that a wide grant of immunity under § 230 is
"constitutionally, practically, and socially preferable to [any] alternatives - especially as applied to the
new landscape of online services"); see also Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177 (McKeown, C.J.,
dissenting) (indicating that "there should be a high bar to liability for organizing and searching third-
party information").
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uncertainty about the rules for website providers. 106 Absent a bright line
rule, a webhost will not have the comfort of knowing that he is immune
under § 230 for third-party postings. 0 7 Accordingly, if a website provider
knows that he may potentially face liability for publishing user-generated
messages, he may "restrict or abandon many of the features that enable the
dissemination of third-party content."108 This is especially true where the
website carries a "staggering volume of third-party content." 09 Thus,
because imposing liability may cause an operator to limit the scope of his
website's services on the side of caution, it can hardly be said to encourage
the "vibrant and competitive free market" on the Internet.110
A final argument in favor of expansive immunity is that Congress simply
intended broad immunity as the means to achieve its policy goals.1 In her
dissent in Roommates.com, Judge McKeown suggested that Congress
clearly purported to create a "high bar" to liability for organizing user-
generated content on the Internet even though traditional information
providers did not have immunity for similar editing functions.11 2 The
Internet was distinguished from other media because it represented a new
form of communication with "unique opportunities for cultural
106 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 ("The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech
would have an obvious chilling effect."); see also Brief for Amazon.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendant-Respondent at 4, Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. June 15, 2005) (Nos. 04-56916, 04-57173), 2005 U.S.
9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 442, 8 (explaining that because the vitality of the Internet depends in part on the
ability to avoid liability for content created by one of the millions of third-party users, imposing liability
would create uncertainty among website providers and thus "imperil the future growth" of the online
community).
107 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177 (McKeown, C.J., dissenting) (indicating that the
majority's proposed standard for imposing liability "offers interactive computer service providers no
bright lines and little comfort in finding a home within § 230(c)(1)").
108 Brief for Amazon.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 106, at 31.
109 See id.; see also Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 331 (noting that website providers might be forced to
"severely restrict the number and type of messages posted" because it would be "impossible for service
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems").
110 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (1996) (identifying preserving the "vibrant and competitive free
market" unfettered by regulation as one of the express policies of Congress).
III See Brief for Amazon.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 106, at 32 (arguing that an
interpretation of § 230, such as the one proposed by Fair Housing Council in Roommates.com, that
tends to expand the liability of website providers for third-party content "contravenes [the] express
Congressional goal"); see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027 (stating that Congress made the legislative
choice to provide immunity to advance its policy objective of encouraging "the unfettered and
unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of e-
commerce").
112 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177 (McKeown, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he anomaly that a
webhost may be immunized for conducting activities in cyberspace that would traditionally be cause for
liability is exactly what Congress intended by enacting [§ 230].") (emphasis added); see also 800-JR
Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 295 (D.N.J. 2006) ("The purpose of [§230] is to
promote self-regulation of Internet service providers. Basically, the [legislation] shields service
providers from liability for the content of websites of third parties that are accessed through the
Internet.").
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development."ll 3 Congress recognized the need to facilitate its
developmenti" 4 and thus "chose[] to treat cyberspace differently."115 The
courts have understood this to mean that Congress intended to grant
expansive immunity, and in the past six years, Congress has not expressed
any disapproval with that interpretation.11 6 Accordingly, some of those in
favor of broad immunity rely on this approval to support the decision to
"stay the course of 'robust' webhost immunity.""17
B. A Case for Limited Immunity
In response to this zealous support for expansive immunity, a number of
scholars contend that a scheme of more limited immunity under § 230 is
appropriate and potentially necessary. One consideration underlying this
view is the effect that blanket immunity for Internet service providers may
have on the private individual. 118 These scholars argue that § 230 does a
"true disservice" to private individuals harmed on the Internet because
when website provider immunity is coupled with the fact that most Internet
users are anonymous, the chance of recovery shrinks. 19 When comments
113 See § 230(a)(3). Congress also found that the Internet offered a "forum for a true diversity of ..
discourse" and "myriad avenues for intellectual activity." Id.
114 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1187 (McKeown, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
explicitly drafted the law to permit unfettered development); see also § 230(b)(2) (articulating the
United States' policy to preserve the vibrant Internet market "unfettered by Federal or State
regulation").
115 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027. The District Court for the District of Columbia further
underscored Congress's intention to provide different treatment for website providers:
In recognition of the speed with which information may be disseminated and the near
impossibility of regulating information content, Congress decided not to treat providers of
interactive computer services like other information providers such as newspaper magazines or
television and radio stations, all of which may be held liable for publishing or distributing
obscene or defamatory material written or prepared by others.
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).
116 See Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d at 1123 (noting that "courts have treated §230(c) immunity as
quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition of 'interactive computer service' and a relatively
restrictive definition of 'information content provider"'); see also Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1187
(McKeown, C.J., dissenting) (expressing the idea that "[hiad Congress discovered that, over time,
courts across the country have created more expansive immunity than it originally envisioned under [§
230], Congress would have amended the law").
17 Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at I188.
118 See generally Langdon, supra note 25 (arguing that § 230 effectively deprives the private
individual of adequate legal remedies); see also Sheridan, supra note 32, at 150 (discussing how §230
bars people who have been defamed from recovering from the large service providers who may have
contributed to the damages).
119 See Langdon, supra note 25, at 854 (suggesting that user anonymity and service provider
immunity may force attorneys to advise their clients against filing defamation claims); see also Sewali
K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims: How
Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REv. 647, 688 (2002) (explaining that "[p]roviding a blanket
immunity to [intemet service providers] may have the negative consequence of wiping out the existence
of tort defamation claims altogether in the Internet context").
370 JOURNAL OF CIVLRIGH7S& ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:2
are made anonymously, individuals are left with very few, if any, avenues
for recovery.120 Even when comments are not made anonymously,
however, the private individual is still denied an adequate opportunity for
redress because he is prohibited from going after deep-pocket companies,
such as America Online or Microsoft Network.121
Another argument in favor of limiting the scope of immunity under §
230 is that absolute blanket immunity gives very little incentive for Internet
service providers to take responsibility for the material on their website.122
One of Congress's purposes behind enacting § 230 was to encourage the
website providers to "self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material
over their services."123 Yet absolute immunity is entirely inconsistent with
a goal of self-regulation because an Internet service provider will have no
incentive to self-regulate if he knows that he will be immune from liability
regardless of whether or not he polices the content on his website.124 Thus,
120 The trend appears to be to sue the Internet service provider in lieu of the anonymous
commentator - even though the provider will most likely be deemed immune. See, e.g.,
Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d at 1122. In a recent case that is attracting a lot of media attention, however,
two females filed a lawsuit against 40 anonymous website posters using their screennames. See
Christian Nolan, Yale Law School defamation case explores anonymous Website users'free speech
rights, CoNN. L. TRIB., Mar. 26, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1206441805828. The plaintiffs issued a subpoena for information relating to "AK47," one of the
anonymous individuals responsible for making sexually explicit comments about them. See Doe I v.
Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d. 249, 250 (D. Conn. 2008). The defendant moved to quash the subpoena on
the ground that disclosure of his identity would violate his First Amendment right to engage in
anonymous speech. See id. at 253. In a decision that shocked a number of individuals in the legal
community, the court denied the motion to quash, finding that the plaintiffs interest in pursuing
discovery in the case outweighed the defendant's First Amendment right to speak anonymously. See id.
at 257. In response to the identification of "AK47," Ryan Singel commented: "The unmasking of the
posters marks a milestone in a rare legal challenge to the norms of online commenting[.]" Ryan Singel,
Yale Students' Lawsuit Unmasks Anonymous Trolls, Opens Pandora's Box, WIRED, July 30, 2008,
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2008/07/autoadmit (emphasis added). This suggests that
plaintiffs attempt to uncover the identity of the anonymous poster was somewhat exceptional.
121 See Patel, supra note 119, at 661 (noting that "since the CDA's enactment in 1996, there has
not yet been a single case that has held an [internet service provider] liable for disseminating third-party
defamatory statements over the Internet"); see also Sheridan, supra note 32, at 149 (explaining that
mandating immunity under § 230 "denies individuals whose reputations have been damaged any
recovery against even the largest corporations whose malfeasance or nonfeasance contributed to the
damage").
122 See Langdon, supra note 25, at 848 (suggesting that "[b]y allowing virtually total immunity in
defamation actions, section 230(c)(1) creates no incentive for Internet providers to remove defamatory
material"); see also Patel, supra note 119, at 678 (discussing that a "problem created by the blanket
immunity provided to [intemet service providers] is that it has left no incentive for [intemet service
providers] to monitor or edit their content").
123 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (1996) (stating that "[i]t is the
policy of the United States . . . to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services").
124 See Langdon, supra note 25, at 855 (remarking that the only incentive for website providers to
remove libelous material is to improve customer relations); see also David L. Hudson Jr., Taming the
Gossipmongers, 94 A.B.A.J. (forthcoming July 2008), available at http://abajoumal.com/magazine/
tamingthegossipmongers (quoting Daniel Solove, a law professor, explaining that § 230 has "been
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"[t]he net effect of [§ 230] is to give free reign to the Internet companies to
do whatever they please." 25 To avoid this result, scholars propose
removing the safety net of absolute immunity, thereby encouraging website
providers to act responsibly to avoid liability.126
Finally, some scholars argue against robust immunity because they are
not entirely convinced that Congress intended such sweeping protection. 27
The argument is that broad immunity should not "be inferred by a court
from a statute that does not explicitly confer it[.]"128 Expansive immunity
for website providers may appear consistent with the intent to promote free
and dynamic communication on the Internet, but that does not necessarily
mean that Congress purported to grant it in § 230.129 In fact, granting
blanket immunity to service providers who permit unlawful or defamatory
activity in the name of "promoting free speech" is inconsistent with the
authority of First Amendment law. The Supreme Court has held that
although the First Amendment prohibits legislation against free speech, it
"cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language."1 30 In other words, even where free speech
is implicated, absolute immunity does not exist.131 In light of this principle,
it is more likely that Congress did not intend to grant blanket immunity for
turned into a blanket immunity that allows sites to leave up content that they know if defamatory or
invasive of privacy").
125 Langdon, supra note 25, at 848.
126 See id. at 854-55 (suggesting that the courts extend liability to Internet providers in situations
where they are placed on notice that they are distributing defamatory material, effectively forcing
website providers to "assume some responsibility for the materials that pass through their services"
without undermining Congress's goal to promote the development of the Internet); see also Sheridan,
supra note 32, at 179 (questioning whether immunity is necessary and noting that it "creates an
asymmetry between electronic and print media that is difficult to justify").
127 See Sheridan, supra note 32, at 151 ("[B]road immunity represents a value judgment not to be
made lightly by Congress[.]"); see also Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal:
Defamation Liability for Third-party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 474 (2004)
("[LIt seems reasonable to assume that if Congress had wanted to grant immunity from distributor
liability, it would have done so explicitly.").
128 Sheridan, supra note 32, at 151 (arguing that "until Congress acts more clearly, courts should
continue to resolve cases involving alleged distributor liability according to traditional tort principles").
129 See id. at 178 (noting that although freedom from distributor liability might be necessary to
"preserve the 'never-ending worldwide conversation' on the Internet, there is little evidence that
Congress made the choice to grant it in enacting § 230 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883
(E.D. Pa 1996)); see also Lee, supra note 127, at 493 (stating that the narrower construction of Barrett
v. Rosenthal is probably more consistent with Congress' original intent and would make amendments
by Congress unnecessary to end distributor immunity from liability).
130 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
131 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (noting that the protections afforded by
the First Amendment are "not absolute, and [the Court has] long recognized that the government may
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution"); see also Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (explaining that "[tihere are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem").
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service providers under § 230.
This final argument suggesting that Congress did not intend to grant
absolute immunity stands in stark opposition to the argument supporting
broad immunity on the ground that Congress clearly intended it as the
means to achieve its policy goals.132 Thus, it is no wonder that the courts
have started to disagree on the meaning of § 230 and question the extent to
which Congress intended website providers to be immune from liability.
IV. LIMITING IMMUNITY AS A MEANS TO PROMOTE RESPONSIBILITY
AMONG INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND PROTECT THE PRIVATE
INDIVIDUAL
This section argues that a narrower interpretation of the extent of § 230
immunity provides a superior alternative to blanket immunity. Blanket
immunity frustrates the congressional goals of encouraging self-regulation
and promoting the useful exchange of information on the Internet.
Imposing a scheme of liability, however, is consistent with the policies
behind § 230. First, it will induce website providers to self-regulate and act
more responsibly in overseeing the content on their website, thereby
protecting the private person's right to be free from discrimination,
defamation, and invasion of privacy. Second, it will ensure that service
providers are in fact promoting the exchange of useful and valuable
information, rather than allowing the dissemination of illegal and harmful
speech.
A. Effectuating the Congressional Goals of§ 230 through a Scheme of
Limited Liability
One of the unfortunate consequences of the "vibrant and competitive
free market"1 33 on the Internet is that it threatens the individual's ability to
protect his reputation from unwarranted damage.134 The Internet is "the
most participatory form of mass speech yet developed." 35 It provides
132 See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
133 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (1996).
134 See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 30. Solove claims that because information can spread so easily
and quickly, there will be "more instances when information we want to keep on a short leash will
escape our control." Id. at 29. Once this information finds "its way into the minds of others, we can't
control what they think about it." Id at 35. A person's reputation depends on how others make
judgments about the information they receive. Id at 33. Thus, Solove argues that the unbridled
"proliferation of personal data" on the Internet may severely compromise a person's good reputation.
Id. at 30. This is worsened by the relative anonymity and ease of publishing on the Internet. Lee, supra
note 127, at 471-72.
135 ACLUv. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
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nearly instant access to a wealth of information and facilitates a large-scale
exchange of views and ideas. The cost of this "never-ending worldwide
conversation,"l 36 however, is that it offers "an unprecedented means for
irresponsible individuals to cause damage by propagating false and
defamatory statements around the world at the speed of light."l 37 Even
personal photographs and accurate information may "[spread] around the
Internet like a virus," violating a person's right to privacy.138 Regrettably,
the private individual's injury from Internet gossip is exacerbated by the
fact that the "fragments of information won't [sic] fade away with time."1 39
Information in Cyberspace is "permanent and searchable."140
To curb the amount of harmful and illegal content, there must be some
incentive for Internet service providers to keep a more watchful eye over
the content on their websites. Guaranteeing webhosts immunity under §
230 is not the most effective means of accomplishing this goal because it
rewards a website operator who knowingly ignores offensive third-party
content with the same protection that it rewards a webhost who zealously
combs through user-generated posts.141 Thus, absolute immunity is
inconsistent with the congressional goal of self-regulation. If, on the other
136 Id
137 See Sheridan, supra note 32, at 151; see also Singel, supra note 120 (suggesting that the
Internet is a place where "reputations can be sullied nearly irreparably by anyone with a grudge, a
laptop and a WiFi connection").
138 See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 2. Professor Solove laments some of the terrifying implications
from the flow of information on the Internet. He explains the new phenomenon taking place on the
Internet:
We can now readily capture information and images wherever we go, and we can then share
them with the world at the click of a mouse. Someone you've never met can snap your photo
and post it on the Internet. Or somebody that you know very well can share your cherished
secrets with the entire planet. Your friends or coworkers might be posting rumors about you
on their blogs. The personal email you send to others can readily be forwarded along
throughout cyberspace, to be mocked and laughed at far and wide.
Id Solove suggests that gossip on the Internet is worse than typical "water cooler gossip" because it
transforms gossip into "a widespread and permanent stain on people's reputations." Id. at 181. Thus, he
suggests publishing gossip online, even if only among a few people, should still be considered a
violation of privacy. Id.
139 See id. at 2; see also Singel, supra note 120 (noting that online postings "live on for years in
search-engine results").
140 See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 4. Solove further notes that historically, written gossip has been
considered more harmful than oral gossip. Id. at 181. This is especially true, he suggests, of gossip
written on the Internet. Id. He explains that Internet rumor can spiral out of control because "[e]ven if
[information] is posted on an obscure blog, [it] can still appear in a Google search under a person's
name." Id.
141 See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that, as
an incentive to self-regulate, Congress bars any claims against an Internet service provider for
publishing, withdrawing, or altering content); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52
(D.D.C. 1998) (noting that Congress, "[in some sort of tacit quidpro quo arrangement with the service
provider community . . . has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service
providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-
policing is uasuccessful or not even attempted.").
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hand, the statute imposed liability on webhosts for certain illegal or tortious
user content, those webhosts would be more likely to reconsider the option
of screening such content in order to avoid a lawsuit.
The major concern behind forcing Internet service providers to police
third-party material is that it undermines the express Congressional policies
behind § 230. Imposing liability in certain limited circumstances, however,
will still effectuate the two goals set by Congress. First, Congress
endeavored to encourage self-regulation among Internet service
providers.142 Imposing liability clearly advances this goal because, as
indicated above, the paramount purpose behind imposing liability is to
create incentives for webhosts to act more responsibly and monitor user-
generated posts. Second, Congress purported to "promote the continued
development of the Internet"l 43 and preserve the "robust nature of Internet
communication." 44 A scheme of limited liability tailored to protect the
private individual from damaging speech on the Internet would be perfectly
consistent with these objectives because it would not interfere with the
dissemination of valuable and useful information and ideas. On the
contrary, it would only stifle the publication of harmful, illegal or tortious
commentary. Such material has no value in the eyes of the law145 and thus
contributes very little, if anything, to the "vibrant and competitive free
market" of the Internet.146 In effect, the Internet's growth in size and in
value would be uninterrupted by efforts to encourage website providers to
delete injurious content. Therefore, a policy of affording immunity to
service providers who promote unlawful communication that is neither
valuable nor useful undermines the goal of preserving a vibrant free market
under § 230(b)(2) more seriously than a policy of limited liability.
142 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175
(9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the intent, under § 230, is to encourage service providers' self-policing of
content without fear of liability for every message posted by third parties); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at
331 (explaining that immunizing service providers furthers the purpose of encouraging self-regulation
by eliminating the fear of liability traditionally attached to publishers that regulate offensive material).
143 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (1996).
144 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
145 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (reasoning that since false
statement of facts have no constitutional value, they are not accorded constitutional protection); Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that different types of
speeches occupy different levels on the value scale, and that there may be no public interest in
protecting certain speeches).
146 See § 230(b)(2). One of the purposes of Congress is to preserve this "vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet." Id Importantly, Congress explicitly states that is it
their policy "to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer." Id. at (b)(5). This seems to underscore the
notion that Congress did intend to eliminate certain illegal acts and statements from the landscape of the
Internet. Thus it is clear that not all content is valuable in cyberspace.
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Importantly, in addition to immunizing harmful speech that does not
contribute to the Internet's value, a scheme of absolute immunity would
also immunize speech that may otherwise be punishable. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the First Amendment does not grant absolute
immunity for all classes of speech.147 Indeed, the Constitution permits the
government to regulate certain limited uses of the language.148 For
example, the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech does not
protect "true threats," 49 "fighting words,"150 or other utterances which
may provoke a breach of the peace.151 Likewise, the First Amendment
allows states to punish "the lewd and obscene, the profane, [and] the
libelous." 52 Such communication, which is prohibited in the real world,
should also be prohibited in Cyberspace; to allow otherwise would be
inconsistent with the authority of First Amendment law.153 Granting
absolute immunity to service providers who promote such speech would
have the effect of condoning unlawful utterances. Imposing liability, on
the other hand, would ensure that the unprotected speech does not become
permissible simply because it is disseminated on the Internet. As
evidenced by its stated policy to enforce criminal laws "to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
147 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (commenting that the government may
constitutionally regulate certain types of expression); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382-83 (1992) (expressing that society has accepted limitations on free speech in situations where the
benefit of the speech is minimal when compared to the social interest in maintaining morality, and that
First Amendment protections cannot offend such limitations).
148 See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382-83 (stating that the government has "permitted restrictions upon
the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are 'of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality"' (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). See also Dennis, 341
U.S. at 503 (suggesting that sometimes the societal value of free speech must give way to other
considerations).
149 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (indicating that a true threat is not
protected under the First Amendment, and holding that the petitioner's statements could not be
construed as a true threat).
150 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (noting that that states are free to ban the use
of "personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of
common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction").
151 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.").
152 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (stating that "[a]lthough honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the
fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately
published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity").
153 See Sheridan, supra note 32, at 179 (concluding that "construing 230 to immunize services
from distributor liability creates an asymmetry between electronic and print media that is difficult to
justify"); Peter J. Breckheimer II, A Haven for Hate: The Foreign and Domestic Implications of
Protecting Internet Hate Speech Under the First Amendment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1493, 1507 (2002)
(indicating that it is within the government's power to regulate hate speech on the internet).
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computer,"' 54 Congress clearly did not intend to make all types of Internet
communication and activity lawful. Because a scheme of limited liability
would effectuate this policy and comport with the great authority of First
Amendment law, it appears to be the better alternative.
B. Delineating a Proper Standard for Imposing Liability
Because a narrower interpretation of the scope of immunity under § 230
is consistent with the Congressional objective and the authority of First
Amendment law, the argument that Congress clearly intended broad
immunity as the only means to achieve its policy goalsl55 is unpersuasive.
Therefore, the statute should not be understood as granting absolute blanket
immunity to website providers. What remains to be decided, however, is
when, and under what specific circumstances, liability should attach.
The decision in Roommates.com is a step in the right direction to the
extent that it attempts to limit robust immunity under § 230. Be that as it
may, the standard that the court applied is inadequate to ensure that the
proper Internet service providers face liability. In Roommates.com, the
court proposed that the decisive factor in determining the availability of
immunity should be whether the webhost was a content provider. It
concluded that Internet providers who "[contribute] materially to the
alleged illegality" of the information on their website are content providers,
and thus do not qualify for immunity under § 230.156 Service providers, the
court decided, were eligible to receive the full extent of § 230 protection.157
The fundamental problem with the Roommates.com standard is that it is
too vague to guarantee that courts will impose liability uniformly and
fairly. "Contributing materially" to the unlawfulness of content could
encompass a great number of activities, some of which may not warrant the
imposition of liability. Consider, for example, the theoretical celebrity
gossip forum discussed in the Introduction. The webhost appeared to be a
service provider because he simply created the forum; he did not contribute
to any discussions or supervise the activities of the third-party users. A
court could find, however, that he materially contributed to the
unlawfulness of the user-generated content by virtue of the fact that his
forum was designed to "encourage illegal content," 58 namely defamatory
154 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (1996).
155 See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
156 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d. at 1168.
157 See id. at 1162 (noting that § 230's broad grant of immunity applies "only if the interactive
computer service provider is not also an 'information content provider"').
158 See id. at 1175 (indicating that a webhost materially contributes to the illegality of his website
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gossip about celebrities.
A proper standard for determining when a website provider is immune
under § 230 should not hinge on the tenuous inquiry of whether the
webhost's activities amounted to creation or development of information.
Instead, the courts should focus on the extent to which the Internet service
provider was, or should have been, aware of the possible ramifications of
his website. In other words, the courts should consider whether the
particular nature of the website was such that it should have put the
webhost on notice of the possibility for unlawful third-party posting. If it is
reasonably clear that the website, by virtue of its subject matter or design,
is likely to elicit illegal or tortious content, the website operator should be
held to a higher standard of care with respect to screening user-generated
information. If, however, it is highly unlikely that the website will yield
objectionable material, the operator will have a lesser degree of care and a
stronger presumption of immunity.
The method for applying this proposed standard is clear-cut. The courts
should simply base their determination of the website's risk for illegal
content on two criteria: the inherent subject matter of the website and the
vehicle through which it collects third-party postings. Consider, for
example, the website in Roommates.com.159 In that case, it should have
been extremely clear to the webhost that his site was likely to elicit illegal
information because he made it possible for users to select unlawful
discriminatory responses by providing them in the drop-down menu in the
first place.160 Thus, the specific vehicle through which Roommates.com
gathered the user-generated content should have put the webhost on notice
of the likelihood of unlawful postings. In Carafano, on the other hand, the
webhost had no reason to believe that his users would post tortious
statements. In that case, the website was simply a dating website that
allowed users to create profiles containing descriptive information about
their age, appearance, interests, and personality for the purpose of meeting
someone. 161 Individuals do not typically join these match-making
communities for the purpose of making false and sexually explicit profiles
about celebrities.162 Therefore, the subject matter of the website was not of
if he "[encourages] illegal content, or [designs his] website to require users to input illegal content").
159 In this case, the website was "designed to match people renting out spare rooms with people
looking for a place to live." See id. at I 61.
160 Seeid.atll65.
161 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d at 1121.
162 See id; see also Jeffrey Lipschutz, Internet Dating . .. Not Much Protection Provided by the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 Based on Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3D 1119 (9th Cir.
2003). 23 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 225, 228 (2004) (discussing the safeguards of
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a nature that would have indicated to the webhost a great risk of tortious
third-party postings.
CONCLUSION
The Internet is undoubtedly a valuable tool. This value, however, is
coming at a high price to the very people it is intended to benefit - the
private individuals. Interpreting § 230 as providing robust blanket
immunity to webhosts is problematic insofar as it does not provide any
incentives for interactive computer service providers to carefully monitor
user-generated posts for possible tortious or illegal content. As a result, the
private individual is seriously limited in his ability to protect himself from
discrimination, defamation, invasions of privacy, and other unlawful
attacks. Therefore, a narrower interpretation of § 230 is preferable.
Imposing liability under certain limited circumstances will induce webhosts
to take more responsibility for the content on their websites. Moreover, it
is perfectly consistent with the Congressional policies behind § 230,
namely, to promote the exchange of valuable information and to encourage
the self-regulation of Internet service providers. In order to ensure that the
courts impose liability fairly and coherently, the standard should not hinge
on the tenuous distinction between content providers and service providers.
Rather, the standard should focus on the extent to which the webhost was,
or should have been, aware of the risk of illicit or tortious third-party
postings. Under this standard, Cyberspace will continue to flourish - but
its growth will not come at the expense of the millions of Internet users.
Matchmaker.com).
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